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CASENOTES
BROOKE GROUP LTD. V. BROWN & WILLIAMSON
TOBACCO CORP.: A VICTORY FOR CONSUMER WELFARE
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT*
The need for clarity, obviously a desideratum for any body
of law, has been evidenced by judicial recognition that Rob-
inson-Patman is not to be viewed as an act of Congressional
schizophrenia, an anti-competitive island situated in an
otherwise turbulent sea of pro-competitive efficiency and
maximization of consumer welfare, the hallmarks of the
Nation's antitrust laws. The Supreme Court warned early on
of the dangers of doctrinaire interpretations of Robinson-
Patman that could lead to "conflict with the purposes of
other antitrust legislation."
-Kenneth Starr'
I. INTRODUCTION
The preservation of competition among business entities is
vital to the success of any economy. Recognizing the importance
of competition, the United States Congress has passed antitrust
laws that seek to enhance productivity and protect consumers.
* The author wishes to thank Robert T. Cahill, Jr., whose intelligent comments
and suggestions and constant encouragement made the writing of this Casenote
possible.
1. Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting
Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 63 (1953)). Kenneth Starr made this
statement while he was a judge on the United States Court of Appeals, District of
Columbia Circuit. Judge Starr would later serve as Solicitor General of the United
States during the Bush Administration.
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Although the antitrust laws, like all statutes, are vulnerable to
a variety of different interpretations, "[tihe language of the
antitrust statutes, their legislative histories, the major struc-
tural features of the antitrust law, and considerations of the
scope, nature, consistency, and ease of administration of the
law all indicate that the law should be guided solely by the
criterion of consumer welfare."2 The antitrust laws are intend-
ed to prohibit monopolization, predatory pricing, and other
behaviors that adversely affect competition and ultimately con-
sumer welfare.? In the consumer-driven, capitalist economy of
the United States, competition is the foundation of economic
success. Price discrimination, when used to undermine competi-
tion and destroy consumer welfare, violates the purpose of the
antitrust laws.
Price discrimination that involves injury to sellers of products
is known as "primary-line" injury.4 The Robinson-Patman Act
is the major statutory provision that seeks to combat injury to
competition by price discrimination. On June 21, 1993, in the
first primary-line price discrimination case to reach the United
States Supreme Court in over twenty-five years, the Court
handed down a decision in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp.5 which sought to reaffirm the im-
portance of competition, even if it meant that individual com-
petitors would be adversely impacted. The six to three decision6
extensively altered previous primary-line doctrine that had been
outlined in the 1967 case of Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking
Co.' These alterations make it much more difficult to show
primary-line price discrimination.
2. ROBERT H. BORIC, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 57
(1978).
3. For further in-depth discussions of antitrust law, see PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL.,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
(1978 & SUPP. 1993); PETER D. WARD & MARGARET A. GOLDBLATT, TRADE REGULA-
TION, ANTITRUST AND ECONOMICS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1988).
4. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., -113 S. Ct. 2578,
2586 (1993).
5. Id.
6. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion of the Court joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas.
7. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
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The Court has continually held that "the Robinson-Patman
Act should be construed consistently with broader policies of
the antitrust laws."8 However, in deciding the Brooke Group
case, the Court refocused on competition, rather than individual
competitors, when interpreting the antitrust laws and deter-
mined that previous Court rationale had limited the scope of
competition rather than enhanced it. This new viewpoint on
primary-line cases will have a profound impact on business in
the United States. If the majority is correct, consumers, busi-
nesses, and the country as a whole will significantly benefit
from healthier competition. However, if the majority is wrong,
the decision could have disastrous consequences, including mo-
nopolization of industries, increased prices for goods, and a gen-
eral assault on consumer welfare.
This Casenote will examine what impact the Brooke Group
case has on the welfare of businesses and consumers in the
United States. It will begin by examining the federal statutes
concerning price discrimination. Next, it will turn to past Su-
preme Court doctrine on primary-line price discrimination and
then to an analysis of Brooke Group. Finally, a critical assess-
ment of whether the Robinson-Patman Act achieves its purpose
of combating price discrimination will be made.
II. THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION ACTS9
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act,'0 is the statute of greatest importance to the
Brooke Group case. This Act condemns any discriminatory pric-
ing schemes that adversely affect competition." In order to
8. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 80 n.13 (1979).
9. The three federal statutes that deal with price discrimination and predatory
pricing are the Clayton Act, § 2a, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Price Dis-
crimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1988), the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988), and
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). Since the case of Brooke
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993) only
involves the Robinson-Patman Act and Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission
Act will not be discussed in this Casenote.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1988). Throughout the remainder of the Casenote, section
2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, will simply be re-
ferred to as the Robinson-Patman Act.
11. Section 13(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act states, in part, that:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
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prevail under the Act, plaintiffs need only show that there was
a "reasonable possibility" of substantial injury to competition. 2
However, the "reasonable possibility" standard cannot be met
by mere speculation that injury to competition might have oc-
curred." In "primary-line" cases (i.e., cases involving injury to
competing sellers), injury to competition may be shown through
market analysis or inferred from the seller's predatory intent.'4
Injury to competition, however, cannot be shown simply by
demonstrating that an individual competitor was injured by the
seller's actions." The purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act is
to protect and promote competition, not individual competi-
tors. 6 Thus, price differences that strengthen competition in a
market are not prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act."
Another statute of great importance is the Sherman Act.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ...."" This section
of the Sherman Act is especially interested in halting the prac-
tice of predatory pricing. Predatory pricing can be defined as
"pricing below an appropriate measure of cost for the purpose of
eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing competi-
tion in the long run." 9 The United States Supreme Court, in
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price
between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quali-
ty . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them.
15 U.S.C § 13a (1988).
12. Palls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 434-35 (1983).
13. See, e.g., Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d
950, 957 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
14. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 552 (1960). Another type of case
under the Robinson-Patman Act is a "secondary-line" case which involves injury to
buyers. Since the Brooke Group case is a "primary-line" case, "secondary-line" stan-
dards will not be discussed.
15. Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1340-41 (8th Cir. 1987).
16. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
17. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 250 (1951).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
19. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 n.12 (1986).
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Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,2 stated that predato-
ry pricing is "a practice that harms both competitors and com-
petition. In contrast to price cutting aimed simply at increasing
market share, predatory pricing has as its aim the elimination
of competition."2 In addition, the Court went on to say that
"[piredatory pricing is thus a practice 'inimical to the purposes
of the [antitrust laws]' and one capable of inflicting antitrust
injury." Predatory pricing, therefore, is either pricing below
the level necessary to sell their products or "pricing below some
appropriate measure of costs."' Lowering prices to meet com-
petition does not violate the antitrust laws.
Since the Court's decision in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental
Baking Co.,' primary-line cases under the Robinson-Patman
Act have been interpreted under the same standards that are
used to decide predatory pricing cases under the Sherman
Act.' Consequently, in the past, price discrimination claims
under the Robinson-Patman Act and the Sherman Act have
been analyzed under a cost-based test that infers from pricing
that is above or below some measure of costs, either predatory
or non-predatory behavior.26 Certainly, however, there are
20. 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
21. Id. at 117-18. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing
and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 697
(1975).
22. Id. at 118 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,
488 (1977)). "The short-term effect of certain anti-competitive behavior-predatory
below-cost pricing, for example-may be to stimulate price competition. But competi-
tors may be able to prove antitrust injury before they actually are driven from the
market and competition is thereby lessened." Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489 n.14.
23. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 n.8
(1986).
24. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
25. See McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2110 (1989); Henry v. Chloride, 809 F.2d 1334, 1345 (8th Cir.
1987); D.E. Rogers Assoc. v. Gardner-Denver Co., 718 F.2d 1431, 1437 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1041 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
825 (1982); 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 351-52 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Malcolm v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845, 853 n.16
(5th Cir. Apr.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1125 (1981); Pacific Eng'g & Prod. Co. of Neva-
da v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 798 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879
(1977); International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
26. This method of analyzing price discrimination was most strongly advocated by
Professors Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner of Harvard University. Following Utah
1994] 511
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some differences between the two statutes. The most important
one being that the Sherman Act denounces predatory pricing
which has a "dangerous probability" of monopolization,27 while
the Robinson-Patman Act only requires "a reasonable possibili-
ty" that injury to competition has occurred before behavior is
found to be illegal.28
Regardless of the differences, two prerequisites to recovery
under the Acts remain the same. First, competitive injury must
result from a rival's prices that are below an appropriate mea-
sure of the rival's costs. 29 Second, the rival must have a rea-
sonable prospect (under the Robinson-Patman Act) or a danger-
ous possibility (under the Sherman Act) of recouping its invest-
ment in below-cost prices."0 Unless the plaintiff proves both of
these requirements, a charge of illegal price discrimination will
fail.3'
Pie, Areeda and Turner proposed objective, cost-based rules for distinguishing between
competitive pricing in Robinson-Patman Act "primary-line" cases which disregarded
direct evidence of subjective intent and suggested that the only test should be wheth-
er the seller's price was above or below its "average variable cost." They defined
"variable costs" as "costs that vary with changes in output . .. [including] such items
as materials, fuel, labor directly used to produce the product, indirect labor such as
foremen, clerks and custodial help, utilities, repair and maintenance, and per unit
royalties and license fees." Areeda & Turner, supra note 21, at 700. They go on to
propose that the "average variable cost is the sum of all variable costs divided by
output." Id. These suggestions drew strong opposition from economic conservatives,
including Robert Bork and others from the "Chicago School." See BORK, supra note 2.
For case examples using this "inference" of price discrimination, see supra note 25.
27. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillen, 113 S. Ct. 884, 890 (1993).
28. Falls City Indus. Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 434 (1983).
29. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 n.8 (1986); Utah
Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 698 (1967).
30. 479 U.S. at 119 n.15; 475 U.S. at 589.
31. In the case of Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113
S. Ct. 2578 (1993), only the second requirement, recoupment, is at issue.
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III. PREVIOUS PRIMARY-LINE RATIONALE3 2
A. The Facts of Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co."
Utah Pie Co. had been baking pies for over thirty years when
it decided to enter the Salt Lake City frozen pie market in late
1957."4 The frozen pie market in the area expanded rapidly
between that time and August of 1961, when Utah Pie filed
antitrust charges against the three competitors involved in the
case.3" Utah Pie's financial position and net worth increased
between 1958 and 1961, and its share of the market was
66.5%, 34.3%, 45.5%, and 45.3% respectively.
36
Each of Utah Pie's three major competitors had been selling
pies in Salt Lake City prior to 1957. However, none had plants
in Salt Lake City, and Utah Pie was able to take advantage of
its location and offered its product at a lower price." Eventu-
ally, the three competitors began lowering their prices, precipi-
tating a price war. The competitors ended up selling their pies
in the Salt Lake City area for less than they were being sold in
other markets. Utah Pie had no choice but to also lower its
price. This price war, which resulted in all-time low prices for
pies in the market, may have cost Utah Pie some business, but
32. Until the decision in Brooke Group, no primary-line price discrimination case
had been decided by the United States Supreme Court in more than twenty-five
years. The last case was Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685
(1967), a decision which stood as the definitive authority for primary-line cases until
Brooke Group substantially altered the interpretation of price discrimination laws.
33. 386 U.S. 685 (1967). For a discussion of Utah Pie, see Ward S. Bowman,
Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70 (1967).
34. 386 U.S. at 689.
35. Id. at 684. The three companies charged by Utah Pie of violations of the Rob-
inson-Patman Act included Continental Baking Company, Pet Milk Company, and the
Carnation Company.
36. Id. at 689. Utah Pie was a very small company. Its net worth increased from
$31,651.98 on October 31, 1957 to $68,802.13 on October 31, 1961. Total sales were
$238,000 in the year ending October 31, 1957, $353,000 in 1958, $430,000 in 1959,
$504,000 in 1960, and $589,000 in 1961. Utah Pie suffered a loss of $6,461 in 1957,
and had a net income in the remaining years of $7,090, $11,897, $7,636, and $9,216.
Id.
37. Id. at 690. The majority paid short shrift to the fact that it was Utah Pie
that originally undercut prices in the Salt Lake City market.
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did not wrestle away Utah Pie's market share or lower its prof-
it margin."
B. The Utah Pie Decision3 9
Justice Byron White wrote the seven to two majority decision
that overturned the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit" and reinstated the finding of the United States
District Court for the District of Utah that there was a reason-
able possibility that Utah Pie's three competitors' behavior
injured competition. Although Utah Pie never suffered any
apparent financial damage from the price-cutting, Justice White
stated that the jury "could ... have reasonably concluded that
a competitor who is forced to reduce his price to a new all-time
low in a market of declining prices will in time feel the finan-
cial pinch and will be a less competitive force."" Justice White
insisted that even if the impact on Utah Pie was negligible,
possible damage to other firms justified the decision that price
cuts might injure competition."
The majority denounced the Tenth Circuit's view that since
Utah Pie's sales and profits continued to grow, it was not in-
jured by the price war." The rationale behind the decision
38. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
39. The Supreme Court's decision was the target of much ,criticism. Comdientators
viewed the decision as anti-competitive. Robert H. Bork, the victorious counsel in
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williarinson Tobacco Corp., had been a long-time critic
of the decision. He stated:
There is no economic theory worthy of the name that could find an
injury to competition on the facts of the case. Defendants were convicted
not of injuring competition but, quite simply, of competing. The Supreme
Court's opinion finds a violation of Section 2(a) of Robinson-Patman solely
because the market price for frozen pies went down in Salt Lake City.
There could be no clearer demonstration than the Utah Pie decision that
the statute is essentially anticompetitive and anticonsumer.
BORK, supra note 2, at 387.
40. Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie Co., 349 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1965).
41. 386 U.S. at 699-700.
42. Id. at 700.
43. Id. at 702. Justice White stated:
[We disagree with [the Tenth Circuit's] apparent view that there is no
reasonably possible injury to competition as long as the volume of sales
in a particular market is expanding and at least some of the competitors
in the market continue to operate at a profit. Nor do we think that the
[Robinson-Patman Act] only comes into play to regulate the conduct of
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rested on the belief that the competitors had a predatory intent
when the prices were decreased and that their behavior eroded
competition by causing a drastically declining price structure.'
The Court ruled that knowledge of actual intent can aid the
jury in interpreting the facts in antitrust cases and in predict-
ing the consequences of predatory behavior.45 The Court also
stated that juries could use surrounding economic circum-
stances, including persistent unprofitable sales below cost for
the sellers and drastic price cuts, to ascertain sellers' intent.46
Thus, predatory intent and injury to competition could be deter-
mined by the sellers' overall behavior. As a result, the Court
created the presumption that pricing above some measure of
costs creates an inference of predatory behavior, regardless of
whether there was apparent economic injury to the plaintiff.47
Fxom its very inception, the Utah Pie approach to price dis-
crimination met with hostile criticism. Justice Stewart, writing
a short but strong dissent in Utah Pie, was the first to take on
the troubling decision. He condemned the majority for falling
into "the error of reading the Robinson-Patman Act as protect-
ing competitors, instead of competition."48 It was apparent to
him, and ultimately to others, that the majority's approach
would lead to business practices that would not promote the
welfare of the consumer. It was clear that inefficient and out-
price discriminators when their discriminatory prices consistently under-
cut other competitors.
Id.
44. Id. at 702-03. Justice White defended the holding by asserting:
It might be argued that the respondents' conduct displayed only fierce
competitive instincts. Actual intent to injure another competitor does not,
however, fall into that category, and neither, when viewed in the context
of the Robinson-Patman Act, do persistent sales below cost and radical
price cuts themselves discriminatory. Nor does the fact that a local com-
petitor has a major share of the market make him fair game for discrim-
inatory price cutting free of Robinson-Patman Act proscriptions. "The
Clayton Act proscription as to discrimination in price is not nullified
merely because of a showing that the existing competition in a particular
market had a major share of the sales of the product involved."
Id. at 702 n.14 (quoting Maryland Baking Co., 52 F.T.C. 1679, 1689, affd, 243 F.2d
716 (1957)).
45. Id. at 697 n.12.
46. Id.
47. For case examples of how this presumption has been applied by the courts,
see supra note 25.
48. 386 U.S. at 705 (Stewart, J. dissenting).
19941 515
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moded companies would benefit at the expense of innovative
and productive firms.
The majority's approach in Utah Pie was misguided because
it classified a trend towards lower prices as per se price dis-
crimination. Oddly, the majority never considered that lower
prices would be good for consumers. Certainly, prices which fall
to the point where all but the aggressor in a price war is ban-
ished from the market are not ultimately good for competition.
However, there is a line which must be crossed before a declin-
ing price structure is destructive to an industry.49 The majority
in Utah Pie either failed to realize that there could be a divid-
ing line between good and bad price-cutting or set the line so
high that for all intents and purposes the dividing line became
meaningless."
IV. BROOKE GROUP: A NEW APPROACH TO PRIMARY-LINE
CASES
A. Factual Background and Procedural History
In the mid-1980s, a price war erupted in the domestic ciga-
rette industry. Liggett Group, Inc.,51 in an attempt to regain
49. In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S.Ct. 2578
(1993), Justice Kennedy discussed the costs of erroneously inferring price discrimina-
tion from simple price cuts:
"[Tihe mechanism by which a firm engages in predatory pricing-lowering
prices-is the same mechanism by which a firm stimulates competition;
because 'cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very
essence of competition ... [;] mistaken inferences ... are especially
costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are de-
signed to protect.' It would be ironic indeed if the standards for predato-
ry pricing liability were so low that antitrust suits themselves became a
tool for keeping prices high.
113 S. Ct. at 2589-90 (1993) (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479
U.S. 104, 122 n.17 (1986) (quoting Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986))).
50. Justice Kennedy wrote in Brooke Group:
Utah Pie has often been interpreted to permit liability for primary-line
price discrimination on a mere showing that the defendant intended to
harm competition or produced a declining price structure. The case has
been criticized on the grounds that such low standards of competitive
injury are at odds with the antitrust laws' traditional concern for con-
sumer welfare and price competition.
Id. at 2586-87.
51. Brooke Group Ltd., during the time of the cigarette price war and when the
516
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/
market share, introduced, in 1980, a line of "black and white"
generic cigarettes that sold for substantially less than branded
cigarettes. 2 By 1984, Liggett held 97% of the generic market,
which accounted for 4% of the entire domestic market.53 The
"black and whites" were offered to consumers at a list price
30% lower than branded cigarettes and were promoted at the
wholesale level by means of rebates which increased with the
volume of cigarettes ordered.' The growth of the generic mar-
ket came at the expense of the other firms' profits from brand-
ed cigarettes. Brown & Williamson was hardest hit because its
cigarettes were popular with people most sensitive to price
changes.55 During 1984, Brown & Williamson introduced its
own "black and white" cigarette and beat Liggett's prices. Other
firms also entered the generic market by introducing private
label generics and branded generics, but Brown & Williamson
was the only one to challenge Liggett's dominance in the "black
and white" market." Brown & Williamson marketed its "black
and whites" by offering large volume discounts to whole-
salers." Liggett responded by increasing its own wholesale re-
bates, which resulted in a price war at the wholesale level,
until it was forced to raise its prices to avoid economic hard-
ship." Liggett charged that Brown & Williamson was selling
its "black and whites" at a loss and filed an antitrust lawsuit.
price discrimination suit was originally filed, was known as Liggett Group, Inc. Since
the Court and the parties to the case referred to petitioner by its former corporate
name, this Casenote will also use the name Liggett.
52. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578,
2582 (1993). "Black and whites" are generic cigarettes packaged in plain white pack-
ages with simple black lettering describing their contents, Id.
53. Id. Sales of generic cigarettes had accounted for only 1% of the domestic
market prior to 1980. Id.
54. Id. at 2583.
55. Id. Brown & Williamson had only 11.4% of the branded cigarettes market,
but 20% of those who bought Liggett's "black and whites" had switched from a Brown
& Williamson brand. Id.
56. Id. at 2583-84. R.J. Reynolds had introduced a Value-25 cigarette, dropped its
list price on Doral about 30%, and used volume rebates to wholesalers in order to
compete at Liggett's price level. R.J. Reynolds, however, never marketed a "black and
white" cigarette. Id.
57. Id. Brown & Williamson marketed its "black and whites" to Liggett's distribu-
tors as well as to its own buyers, which included a thousand wholesalers who never
sold generic cigarettes. Id.
58. Id. Liggett raised its rebates five times but still was not able to match Brown
& Williamson's prices. Id.
1994]
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In the summer of 1986, a pattern of twice yearly increases in
the prices of both generic and branded cigarettes was estab-
lished. The dollar amount of these increases was the same for
both generics and branded cigarettes, which resulted in a nar-
rowing of the price gap from 38% in 1984 to 27% in 1989."9 In
addition, by 1989, five of the six manufacturers, including
Liggett, had introduced subgeneric cigarettes which sold for
50% less than branded cigarettes.0 By the time the trial start-
ed in 1989, generics had become 15% of the total market and
Liggett's total sales volume had increased significantly.6 How-
ever, prices for all cigarettes, including generics, had increased
and "black and whites" had declined in market share as con-
sumers shifted toward branded generics.
The district court trial lasted for 115 days and resulted in a
jury verdict in favor of Liggett for $49.6 million in damages,
which the district court trebled to $148.8 million.62 The jury
decided that Brown & Williamson had engaged in price discrim-
ination that had a reasonable possibility of injuring competition.
However, after reviewing the record, the district court ruled
that Brown & Williamson was entitled to a judgment as a mat-
ter of law because no slowing of the growth rate, and thus no
injury to competition, was possible unless there had been tacit
coordination of prices by the various manufacturers.'
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court decision. How-
ever, it greatly expanded the district court's holding by assert-
ing that it is impossible to have competitive injury in an
oligopolistic industry. From the court's perspective, "[t]o rely on
the characteristics of an oligopoly to assure recoupment of loss-
59. Id. at 2585.
60. Id.
61. Id. Overall, the total sales volume of generic cigarettes increased from 2.8
billion in 1981 to 80 billion in 1989. Id.
62. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 748 F.Supp. 344
(M.D.N.C. 1990), affd, 964 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1992), affd, 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
Treble damages are appropriate when injury results from a violation of the antitrust
laws. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988).
63. 748 F. Supp. at 354-55. The district court actually found that three separate
grounds for granting the judgment existed: lack of injury to competition, lack of anti-
trust injury to Liggett, and lack of a causal link between the discriminatory rebates
and Liggett's alleged injury.
518 [Vol. 28:507
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es from a predatory pricing scheme after one oligopolist has
made a competitive move is ... economically irrational."'
B. The Majority Decision
Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, strongly
rejected the theory that recoupment is never possible in an
oligopolistic setting.65 Justice Kennedy, disagreeing with the
Fourth Circuit's holding, stated that a "predatory pricing
scheme designed to preserve or create a stable oligopoly, if suc-
cessful, can injure consumers in the same way, and to the same
extent, as one designed to bring about a monopoly.""6 Although
Justice Kennedy asserted that it is very unlikely that a com-
petitor can ever expect to recoup the losses of price-cutting in
an oligopolistic market, he strongly maintained the view that
"when the realities of the market and the record facts indicate
that it has occurred and was likely to have succeeded, theory
will not stand in the way of liability."67 Nevertheless, the ma-
jority decision firmly established that a showing of competitive
injury will be highly improbable in situations where price cut-
ting occurs in highly competitive markets.'
The majority believed that price-cutting is generally good for
competition, so long as the prices are above the firm's own
costs.6" According to Justice Kennedy, "[1]ow prices benefit con-
64. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335, 342
(4th Cir. 1992), affd, 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
65. Justice Kennedy stated: "We decline to create a per se rule of nonliability for
predatory price discrimination when recoupment is alleged to take place through
supracompetitive oligopoly pricing." Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobac-
co Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2591 (1993).
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2072 (1992)).
68. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
69. Justice Kennedy wrote:
Although Cargill and Matsushita reserved as a formal matter the ques-
tion 'whether recovery should ever be available . . . when the pricing in
question is above some measure of incremental cost,' the reasoning in
both opinions suggests that only below-cost prices should suffice, and we
have rejected elsewhere the notion that above-cost prices that are below
general market levels or the costs of a firm's competitors inflict injury to
competition cognizable under the antitrust laws.
1994] 519
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
sumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as
they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competi-
tion." ° Therefore, discouraging such price cuts, even in an
oligopolistic market, would be poor antitrust policy since lower
prices promote greater consumption and production of goods
and, thus, protect consumer interest and economic well-being.
Ultimately, the Court rejected Liggett's arguments and took a
strong stand in favor of competition. The Court vehemently
opposed any notion that protecting an individual competitor
strengthens competition. "That below-cost pricing may impose
painful losses on its target," Justice Kennedy asserted, "is of no
moment to the antitrust laws if competition is not injured."7
Justice Kennedy even rejected the idea that predatory intent is
determinative to an analysis of Robinson-Patman cases.72 In-
stead, the Cofirt held that the dispositive question is whether
the seller can recoup its losses from price-cutting in the future.
For recoupment to be successful, Justice Kennedy noted, the
below-cost pricing must be capable of producing the effects that
were intended. Below-cost pricing, in itself, does not create a
presumption that recoupment and injury to competition will
result. Instead, Liggett needed to show that Brown & William-
son could achieve enough market share from its actions in
order to set prices high enough, and sustain those prices over a
long period, so that it could earn enough profits to make up for
its previous losses.7" Liggett, however, failed to do this.
Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2588 (internal citations omitted); see Atlantic Richfield
Co. v. U.S.A. Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of
Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 n.8 (1986).
70. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2588 (quoting Atlantic Richfield, 495 U.S. at
340).
71. Id.
72. "Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does
not, without more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws . . . ." Id. at 2589.
Prior to the Brooke Group case, some lower courts had held that intent to eliminate
competitors would be enough to find a primary-line injury. See Henry v. Chloride,
Inc., 809 F.2d 1334 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that predatory pricing of one seller which
injures a competitor is a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing
Co. v. FTC, 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966) (holding that intent to drive competitor out
of the market by pricing below competitor's costs constitutes predatory intent).
73. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2589.
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Liggett did not demonstrate that its theory of tacit collusion
by its competitors was a viable reason for finding primary-line
injury.74 The majority cited Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp.75 as support for its belief that predatory
pricing is improbable, even in an oligopblistic market such as
the cigarette industry. Matsushita, a Sherman Act case, held
that predatory pricing schemes are highly improbable when
coordinated action by competitors is required because each has
a powerful incentive to cheat on any agreement that existed
among them.76 Furthermore, Liggett never even alleged actual
coordination of prices by its competitors. It simply asserted that
the other firms tacitly agreed to control output and prices.
Justice Kennedy correctly rejected this theory. Predatory pricing
is very unlikely without express coordination because each firm
would be forced to rely on imprecise signals from the other
firms when determining their prices.77 This setup would not be
conducive to smooth or successful price coordination. Tacit collu-
sion is the least likely way of recouping losses because the
initial losses must be burdened by the initial predator while
later profits will be shared by all firms in the market in pro-
portion to their market share.78 As Justice Kennedy pointed
out, since Brown & Williamson had only 12% of the market, it
would have to make nine dollars in future profits for every
dollar spent in under-cutting prices.7" Therefore, the likelihood
of Brown & Williamson recouping its losses was practically
none.
In addition, supracompetitive pricing entails a restriction in
output. "In the present setting," Justice Kennedy noted, "in
which output expanded at a rapid rate following Brown &
Williamson's alleged predation, output in the generic segment
can only have been restricted in the sense that it expanded at
a slower rate than it would have absent Brown & Williamson's
74. Tacit collusion is a process, not in itself unlawful, in which firms recognize
that they have a shared interest in controlling price and output and seek to monopo-
lize a market by setting their profits at price-maximizing, supracompetitive levels. Id.
at 2590.
75. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
76. Id. at 590.
77. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2590.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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intervention.""0 However, the rate at which generic cigarettes
were capturing market share did not slow following Brown &
Williamson's entry into the segment. Instead, the average rate
of growth doubled."' Thus, Justice Kennedy was correct in re-
jecting the argument that a firm should prevail on a Robinson-
Patman Act claim when its profits and market share increase,
simply because of a specious fear that a price cut might possi-
bly adversely affect competition in the future. Price cuts are the
very essence of competition and are used by firms to increase
sales volume. The majority, therefore, protected both competi-
tion and consumer welfare by adopting an approach that allows
price-cutting that increases output and consumer demand.
For the majority, the combination of the unstable status of
tacit coordination, the difficulty of a firm with small market
share being able to recoup its losses, and the fact that output
never decreased made Liggett's claims against Brown & Wil-
liamson lacking in merit. This holding is appropriate because it
seeks to prevent unfounded fears about possible injuries to
competition from interfering with consumer welfare. The majori-
ty in Brooke Group recognized that positive price-cutting exists.
Justice Kennedy properly rejected the previous view by realiz-
ing that lower prices in highly competitive markets where mo-
nopolization would be very unlikely to occur is pro-consumer
and pro-competitive. This view allows companies that can pro-
duce goods at lower prices to excel. Thus, the economy of the
country is strengthened, because stiff internal competition pre-
pares American industries for the rigors of international compe-
tition. Certainly, American companies find no such protection of
their individual interests in the world market like those previ-
ously given in the domestic market by Utah Pie.
The Court in Brooke Group, therefore, adopted an approach
that took into account the realities of the modern world mar-
ket.82 This approach ensures price discrimination laws that
80. Id. at 2593.
81. Id.
82. The majority wrote:
As a general rule, the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant mea-
sure of cost either reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged preda-
tor, and so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the practi-
cal ability of a judicial tribunal to control without courting intolerable
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will finally be beneficial to consumers. Thus, the majority prop-
erly laid to rest the poorly reasoned and economically damaging
approach to the Robinson-Patman Act that had been adopted in
Utah Pie.
C. The Dissent'
Justice Stevens strongly criticized Justice Kennedy's analysis
in a lengthy dissent." Justice Stevens wrote that "[t]he fact
that a price war may not have accomplished its purpose as
quickly or as completely as originally intended does not immu-
nize conduct that was illegal when it occurred."85 Accordingly,
Justice Stevens viewed the price discrimination laws as in-
tended to halt any conduct that might injure competition
whether actual injury ever occurs. "The Robinson-Patman Act
was designed to reach discriminations in their incipiency," Jus-
tice Stevens asserted, "before the harm to competition is effect-
ed."' Therefore, Justice Stevens, as was done in Utah Pie,
gave support to a finding of competitive injury if there is even
a "reasonable possibility" that it might occur.
Justice Steven's most forceful comments concerned the
majority's lack of deference to the jury's judgment. He called
the majority's rationale "a hodgepodge of legal, factual, and
economic propositions that are insufficient, alone or together, to
overcome the jury's assessment of the evidence."87 Justice
Stevens correctly stated that the jury was properly instructed
on the law and that, in its judginent, Liggett had satisfied all
risks of chilling legitimate price-cutting. ... "To hold that the antitrust
laws protect competitors from the loss of profits due to such price compe-
tition would, in effect, render illegal any decision by a firm to cut prices
in order to increase market share. The antitrust laws require no such
perverse result."
Id. at 2588 (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116
(1986)).
83. Justice Stevens wrote the dissent in which Justices White and Blackmun
joined.
84. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578,
2598 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 2599.
86. Id. at 2603 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v.
FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 738 (1945)).
87. Id. at 2604.
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the requirements of a prima facie case. He intimated that the
Court should not be concerned with its own perception of the
antitrust laws or whether it could actually be determined that
a "reasonable possibility" of recoupment existed.88 To Justice
Stevens, these issues were ones that the Supreme Court should
have left solely to the jury.89
Justice Stevens, however, was mistaken in his criticism. The
United States Supreme Court has the ultimate job of interpret-
ing federal statutes. When the statutes have not been construed
in a way that promotes positive public policy, the Supreme
Court has a duty to alter prevailing interpretations and even to
reevaluate its own past decisions. The Supreme Court realized
that it is good public policy to have lower consumer prices and
economic efficiency. Thus, the Supreme Court exercised excel-
lent judgment in sweeping aside the Utah Pie decision. Justice
Stevens' justifications for his attempt to hang on to the damag-
ing anti-competitive price discrimination rationale that had
been created twenty-six years earlier, were therefore lacking
sound economic logic.
V. CRITICISM OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
The Brooke Group decision was responsive to widespread
criticism that the Robinson-Patman Act, in and of itself, sub-
verts the interests of consumers. "Critics, in a 'contest of wit-
ticisms,' have had much fun with the Act, calling it the Ty-
phoid Mary of Antitrust,' a 'grotesque manifestation of the scis-
sors and paste-pot method' of draftsmanship, and something
ranking 'high on the list of things with which economic non-
sense is associated."' 90
Numerous commentators believe that the mere existence of
the Robinson-Patman Act is contrary to the broad goals of the
antitrust laws because itq ideas direct enforcement of the Sher-
man Act away from protecting consumer welfare and healthy
88. See id. at 2605-06.
89. See id. at 2606.
90. Hugh C. Hansen, Robinson-Patman Law: A Review and Analysis, 51 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1983) (internal citations omitted).
[Vol. 28:507524
BROOKE GROUP V. BROWN & WILLIAMSON
competition.9' Businesses, thus, encounter a situation where
the Sherman Act encourages them to "go out and compete,"
while the Robinson-Patman Act, on the other hand, tells them
to "go out and compete, but don't get caught."92 This conflict
produces widespread disrespect for the price discrimination laws
and commercial costs such as higher prices resulting from in-
creased costs of doing business, price rigidity, and price fix-
ing." In addition, Utah Pie and subsequent lower court deci-
sions only intensified attacks on the Robinson-Patman Act.
Robert Bork, the victorious counsel in the Brooke Group case,
had argued for years that the Utah Pie decision revealed how
anti-competitive and anti-consumer the statute was.94 To Bork,
however, the true problem was with the attempt to tackle price
discrimination through the Robinson-Patman Act or any other
legislation:
The attempt to counter the supposed threat to competi-
tion posed by price discrimination constitutes what is surely
antitrust's least glorious hour. The instrument fashioned for
the task was the Robinson-Patman Act, the misshapen
progeny of intolerable draftsmanship coupled to wholly
mistaken economic theory. One often hears of the baseball
player who, although a weak hitter, was also a poor fielder.
Robinson-Patman is a little like that. Although it does not
prevent much price discrimination, at least it has stifled a
great deal of competition.
Revision of the statute is not the answer, however, for
price discrimination is not a proper target for antitrust, and
in any event, the phenomenon seems beyond the effective
reach of law.95
While the majority in Brooke Group did not adopt Bork's view
that price discrimination laws can never be beneficial, it did
embrace the view that excessive regulation of pricing can only
result in injury to competition.
91. See, e.g., Wesley J. Liebeler, Let's Repeal It, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 18, 19 (1976).
92. Hansen, supra note 90, at 1187.
93. Id. at 1187-88.
94. See BOR, supra note 2, at 387.
95. Id. at 082.
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Before Brooke Group, interpretations of the Act focused on
price differences and only indirectly touched on price discrimi-
nation. 6 Sales at different prices were a prima facie case of
price discrimination. Legitimate reasons for price differentials
were not taken into account. Thus, the Robinson-Patman Act
was misconstrued so greatly that it no longer fulfilled its pur-
poses of combating price discrimination, protecting competition,
and promoting consumer welfare. Even after the pro-consumer
decision in Brooke Group, the approach that the Robinson-Pat-
man Act takes to price discrimination will continue to be dif-
ficult to justify.97
When the Act was passed in Congress in 1936, the main
concern was with protecting small businesses from large "chain
stores" that could sell goods more cheaply.9" This concern sub-
sequently slanted judicial interpretation of the Act toward pro-
tecting individual competitors.99 Therefore, the Act became one
which protected narrow, individual interests at the expense of
general economic efficiency and consumer welfare. The result
has been higher consumer prices and declining economic effi-
ciency.
Despite widespread criticism, no movement to repeal the
Robinson-Patman Act has ever had much success. Fortunately,
the view that the Robinson-Patman Act generally benefits the
nation has prevailed. Supporters of the Act believe it has sim-
96. See Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc. 460 U.S. 428, 434-37
(1983); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960).
97. Cf AD Hoc SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT AND
RELATED MATTERS, RECENT EFFORTS TO AMEND OR REPEAL THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT, H.R. REP. No. 1738, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (debating the merits of the
Robinson-Patman Act).
98. See 80 CONG. REC. S6346 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1936); FREDERICK M. ROWE,
PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1962); Paul H. LaRue, The
Robinson-Patman Act: The Great Issues and Personalities, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 137
(1986) ("The substantial growth of retail chains in this era was seen as threatening
traditional systems of distribution; the chains' direct buying practices were viewed as
a threat to the independent wholesaler and broker, and their lower prices were per-
ceived as a threat to the independent retailer.").
99. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); Standard
Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726
(1945); Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th
Cir. 1959); Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957); Ben Hur Coal
Co. v. Wells, 242 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1957); Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms
Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955).
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plified complex pricing structures and discount formulas which
made little business sense, discouraged under-the-table deals in
advertising and promotion arrangements, and prevented preda-
tory pricing practices to the extent that they actually exist.'
In addition, "there is a psychological benefit for small business-
es to know that at least one law is concerned with 'fair dealing'
and was passed for their specific benefit."'0 '
The Act undoubtedly has many problems, but prohibiting
behavior that actually injures competition or results in monopo-
lization is necessary. The Supreme Court has recognized that
while injury to competition is highly improbable in competitive
industries, it is still possible. Justice Kennedy, in Brooke Group,
correctly reaffirmed this approach. The real problem is how the
Robinson-Patman Act has been interpreted. The Act forbids any
discrimination which substantially lessens competition or tends
to create a monopoly. 10 2 It does not state that mere price dif-
ferentials without any actual injury violates the regulations of
the Act. This interpretation was created by the courts in Utah
Pie and other cases. Brooke Group, by requiring proof of actual
injury, corrected the faulty rationale of previous primary-line
cases. Thus, the Act now serves the vital interest of punishing
companies who actually injure competition and consumer wel-
fare, but no longer inhibits business practices that benefit the
nation's overall economic well-being.
VI. CONCLUSION
For twenty-six years, both businesses and consumers in the
United States have contended with the decision in Utah Pie.
Businesses who lowered prices to gain competitive advantage in
the market-place were subjected to costly legal actions. Lower
prices should be what public policy strives to achieve. Yet, the
Supreme Court defied common sense and handed down a pri-
mary-line price discrimination decision that sought to protect
narrow, individual interests of certain competitors at the ex-
pense of consumers. The Supreme Court failed to realize that
100. E.g., Hansen, supra note 90, at 1186-87.
101. Id.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1988).
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companies would not deliberately lower prices and sustain loss-
es if they had virtually no chance of recouping those losses. No
business would survive if it did. In fact, businesses that prac-
tice such self-defeating policies do not exist for long, because a
dynamic, growing economy will not tolerate such incompetent
business practices. Therefore, since market realities shield
against injury from below-cost pricing, the United States Su-
preme Court need not be concerned with whether the practices
of poorly-managed businesses will impede the goals of promot-
ing consumer welfare and ensuring economic competition that
the price discrimination laws are meant to achieve.
Certainly, monopolization of industry is a dangerous threat to
the economic welfare of the country. However, in industries
where it is impossible for one company to control the market,
competitors should be left alone to compete. Economic efficiency
will never be achieved if businesses have to constantly
overcome mountains of regulations and legal red tape in addi-
tion to trying to compete and win against industries from all
over the world. Fortunately, the Supreme Court finally realized
its error and rescinded the erroneous rationale of Utah Pie. °3
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. marks
a new era of pro-competition and pro-consumer judicial inter-
pretation that can only help the nation prosper economical-
ly.104 Decisions in lower courts are already being influenced by
103. For newspaper accounts of the Supreme Court's decision in Brooke Group, see,
e.g., Paul M. Barrett, Justices Reject Cigarette Firm's Antitrust Appeal: Ruling Makes
It Tougher to Win Suits Contesting Rivals' Deep Price Cuts, WALL ST. J., June 22,
1993, at A3, and Linda Greenhouse, Cigarette Antitrust Suit is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 1993, at D2.
104. Perhaps the greatest impact Brooke Group will have on economic efficiency is
that it finally brings a degree of certainty to the subject of primary-line price dis-
crimination. For the past twenty-six years, businesses were unsure whether price-cut-
ting would lead to a lawsuit. Certainly, Utah Pie made a declining price structure a
per se indicator of "primary-line" price discrimination. Under the Utah Pie rationale,
the Robinson-Patman Act was used to prevent price discrimination in its incipiency
without actual proof of injury to other competitors. However, some lower courts in the
past twenty-six years recognized the egregious error of the Supreme Court in Utah
Pie and required a showing of actual injury to competition in the market. In Boise
Cascade Corp. v. FTC, the court emphasized the need to look at "cold, hard facts" to
rebut an inference of competitive injury because "[i]njury to competition is . . . the
name of the Robinson-Patman game." 837 F.2d 1127, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Despite
the movement away from the Utah Pie rationale by some courts, the inferred injury
standard still continued to have its followers. See Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 830 F.2d
1513 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the plaintiff only had to show that a substantial
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the Brooke Group case. °5 In the future, businesses will be
free from legal worries about cutting prices in order to compete
more effectively in the world market. Consumers will benefit
from the results. Consequently, the basic purpose of the price
discrimination laws of benefitting consumer welfare finally will
be realized.
Keith Allen May
price differential existed over a period of time). Obviously, then, no agreement on the
proper standard for price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act existed prior
to Brooke Group. Therefore, Brooke Group was a strong effort to end the chaos that
had surrounded primary-line cases for the past quarter-century.
105. See R.W. Int'l Corp. v. Welch Food, Inc., No. 93-1704, 1994 WL 9478 (1st Cir.
Jan. 20, 1994); U.S.-A Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 87-5681, 1994 WL
1944 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 1994); Vollrath Co. v. Sammi Corp., 9 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir.
1993); Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Management, Inc., 998 F.2d 1073 (1st Cir.
1993); see also United States v. Western Elec. Co., Nos. 92-5079, 92-5111 to -5113,
92-5167 to -5168, 1993 WL 532886 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 1993) (Williams, J., dissenting).
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